Essay written by Maria Anna Sampson as part of the China & Globalisation MSc Program at the King's Lau China Institute.
Introduction
The chip-manufacturing industry has attracted much attention, with recent supply-chain problems highlighting the importance of microchips in every technology and machine. They are the pillar of the global economy. As the world’s second largest economy, China has the potential to massively profit from this industry. Yet, China is not the sector’s biggest force; instead Taiwan is, with the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) being the largest chip-manufacturing company in the world, causing considerable geopolitical tensions.
This essay will argue that geopolitics is a driving force in the chip-manufacturing industry, greatly impacting its main actors and dynamics. To do so, it will first consider the global chip-manufacturing industry, its significance, and its main actors. It will then look at the industry in China specifically, as well as China’s role in global chip-manufacturing. TSMC will then be introduced as a case study, considering its rise and strategy for doing business globally, and in China. It will finally analyse this case study through the lens of geopolitics as a significant influence over the sector.
The global industry
To understand the semiconductor industry in China, it is essential to introduce the business of semiconductor chips on a global scale. These ‘chips’ are pieces of semiconductor materials with carved transistors (Miller, 2022). Every electronic device is powered by these transistors, from smartphones to military and intelligence equipment. Semiconductors have therefore become an essential commodity, increasing the industry’s stakes. One of TSMC’s employees explained that their importance “comes not from the dollar value, or how difficult it is to make them, but from their importance to everyday life, like the sun, water, or air. […] If these things are destroyed, the impact could be bigger than running out of oil” (Drum Tower, 2023).
They are a product of extensive globalisation (Schewe, 2021). Advanced semiconductors are not produced in each country they are used in, but instead are part of a complicated chain of global production (Miller, 2022). For example, their technology relies on a combination of American inventions dating back to the 1960s, European manufacturing machinery, and Taiwanese production capacity (Miller, 2022). This makes the development of the global semiconductor industry remarkably reliant on globalisation, international corporation and stability.
The COVID-19 pandemic and its resulting semiconductor shortage crisis that hindered car manufacturing demonstrate the industry’s global nature and significance (Ramani et al., 2022). Governmental lockdowns, restrictions of global movement and the complexity of semiconductor supply chains halted the auto industry in 2020 (Ramani et al., 2022, 5). Machines such as cars often rely on hundreds of suppliers, who produce their semiconductors from multiple manufacturers (Ramani et al., 2022, 5). The long assembly line needed to make products that run on semiconductors demonstrates the delicacy of the sector. Its strategic significance can therefore not be exaggerated.
Having introduced the sector’s importance, one must consider its main actors and dynamics. The five countries dominating it are the United States (U.S.), South Korea, Japan, China, and Taiwan (Hufbauer et al., 2022). Each cannot operate alone, as they are all reliant on each other for different types of technologies (Hufbauer et al, 2022). Whilst each country specialises in something unique, competition in this field is heightened by its strategic influence and global economic impact, creating the perfect conditions for a “chip war” (Miller, 2023). This struggle is not only commercial, but also geopolitical and military, as semiconductors are critical for advanced military equipment. The chip war that governs the industry is grounded in tensions characteristic of the strategic technology industry, a concept that dates back to the Cold War (Money Talks, 2023).
TSMC is at the heart of this ‘war,’ as one of the largest manufacturers of semiconductors (Lee et al., 2006). In fact, some of the chips that TSMC produces, such as those used to make iPhones, “can only be made in Taiwan” (Miller, 2022, 224). Most countries like the U.S. therefore rely on Taiwan and TSMC for their semiconductors and China is no exception to this rule. It depends heavily on Taiwan for their integrated circuit needs, making semiconductor business in China extremely fragile and complex.
Chinese semiconductor industry
This part of the essay will consider the Chinese chip-manufacturing industry with a particular focus on import reliance and Chinese efforts for self-sufficiency in the field. Having considered the strategic significance of the global chip industry, China’s efforts to establish self reliance in the field are not surprising.
Currently, China primarily depends on imports for their semiconductors. In fact, it spends more money per year on semiconductors than on oil (Miller, 2022). In 2018, China spent $312 billion on importing semiconductors, compared to their local industry production worth only $23.7 billion (Grimes et al, 2022). As of 2023, China’s role in the trade of semiconductors has improven, but exports are still said to be “insufficient,” with China primarily relying on imports to sustain their industry (Zhang et al, 2023).
To understand why China relies on importing semiconductors, one must consider the two major companies manufacturing the vital technology in China. The local industry relies on Hua Hong Semiconductor Limited and Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC). Whilst the former is a privately owned company, the latter is partially owned by the state (Che et al., 2023). It is important to not undermine the role of these companies in the international market, as both Hua Hong and SMIC have ranked steadily in the Top 10 foundries in the worldwide semiconductor industry by revenue and market share (Grimes et al, 2023). In 2019, they ranked ninth and fifth in the market’s largest companies, awarding China 6% of the total global market share (Grimes et al, 2023). However, the same year, Hua Hong and SMIC still did not dominate the Chinese market, with two South Korean companies (SKHynix and Samsung) acquiring 60% of the national market (Grimes et al, 2023). Comparatively, Hua Hong and SMIC generated a combined market share of about 20% (Grimes et al, 2023). Due to the complexity of different types of semiconductors and their production, one must be cautious to not oversimplify these statistics. Yet, it is evident that China still relies heavily on imports and foreign technology for their semiconductors.
There are multiple reasons for China’s lack of independence and dominance in this field. Firstly, the intricacy and speed at which semiconductors are produced make it uniquely easy to fall behind. More specifically, when a new generation of chips is created, the previous generation is quickly replaced, heavily impacting the price of the former (Grimes, 2023). The effect of this is only hindered by China’s lack of access to the newest and most advanced technology available in the manufacturing of chips. Global efforts to prevent China from gaining access to this technology “deterred the growth and development” of the national industry (Choi, 2023). These international efforts are primarily pushed by the U.S., and are often referred to as the China-U.S. trade war. 2022 was arguably the most intense year of the ‘war,’ with China responding to U.S. export controls by criticising the it diplomatically and filing a suit against its counterpart in the World Trade Organisation (Allen, 2023). This point will be considered in greater detail when analysing TSMC through the lens of geopolitical influence in the chip-manufacturing industry.
The above is critical for understanding why China has furiously tried to develop self-reliance in the realm of microchips, although the rate of dependence is still high. An example of such efforts is Document No. 8, a document published by the Chinese State Council in 2020, which highlighted a push for domestic production of semiconductors through financial government support like corporate profit taxes for Chinese companies (Allen, 2023). Another campaign-style example of self-reliance ventures is the Made in China 2025 policy, which is an industrial policy to “reduce China’s dependence on foreign manufactured goods (PRC State Council, 2015).
This raises an important question: why did China not develop its market as rigorously as other Asian countries like Japan and Taiwan, during the Asian electronics revolution? Its two major semiconductor companies were both established in the late 1990s. This delay can be attributed to Mao’s haunting of the industry’s significance and inhibition of the influence of globalisation in technology, especially following the exile or killing of scientists in the Cultural Revolution (Miller, 2022, 172-173). Miller says that it became “impossible to attract foreign investment or conduct serious science,” minimising China’s industry (Miller, 2022 172). This unique stalling in development is another reason why China now struggles with gaining self-sufficiency.
Evidently, there is an obvious struggle between American-initiated attempts to hinder China’s development in the field, and China’s resistance and efforts to become self-reliant in the sector. This is essential for understanding conducting semiconductor business in China, and has heavily influenced TSMC’s Chinese activity.
Case study: TSMC
TSMC is a Taiwanese company founded in 1987 by Morris Chang, with the considerable support of the Taiwanese government (Ouyang, 2006). Today, the semiconductor sector cannot be discussed without considering TSMC. In 2021, it obtained 84% of the industry’s market share (The Economist, 2021). Others have gone as far as claiming that TSMC makes Taiwan the “center of the world” and do not predict a slow down in the company’s successes (Miller, 2022). This gives rise to this section’s two major points: TSMC’s road to success and their strategic approach to working with direct competitors on both corporate and state levels.
The technology business requires strong manufacturing capability and customer service (Hsieh et al., 2002), which explain its rise and business strategy respectively.
In terms of manufacturing capability, TSMC has benefited considerably from the support of the Taiwanese government, shedding light on its rise. Ouyang cites Hong in explaining the lengths to which the Taiwanese Ministry of Economic Affairs had to go to secure reluctant private investors to support the development of the company, which included “threats of tax auditing, stopping issuing permits, government contracts and loans” (Ouyang, 2006). At the time of its founding, the Taiwanese government owned 49% of TSMC (Ouyang, 2006). The state’s involvement did not stop after the launch of the company and has contributed to TSMC’s success via strategic manipulation of industry and global circumstances. For example, it took advantage of the geographical shift in chip-manufacturing, and the slowdown of American fabs in the late 1990s (Miller, 2022). By “pouring funds” into the chip industry, they secured the world’s best engineers to advance their semiconductor sector (Miller, 2022, 177). They also utilised the lingering Maoist culture which prevented important investors and engineers from committing to TSMC’s Chinese counterparts, as they believed that “Asia’s electronics revolution had completely passed by mainland China” (Miller, 2022, 175). This led to foreign investment in TSMC to skyrocket to 7,485 foreign institutions and natural persons who own 71% of shares (TSMC, 2023, 68) from a sole foreign investor (Phillips) that owned 27.5% at the time of founding (Ouyang, 2006). Using this investment, TSMC built fabs and attracted clients (Miller, 2022, 208). It is now “leading the way in technology breakthroughs,” (Cheng et al, 2019).
Regarding TSMC’s business strategy, it is governed by customer service and trust. Since 1998, TSMC has prided itself in being “a partner, not a competitor with other semiconductor businesses” (TSMC, 1998). The value of collaboration and robust communication is still a determining factor for TSMC’s success. This non-competitive principle was also part of TSMC’s 2022 annual report, in which the company emphasised its commitment to not designing, manufacturing or marketing any semiconductors “under its own name” to prevent competition with clients (TSMC, 2023).
This value is embodied through initiatives to establish innovative client communication and robust data protection. For example, its ‘Virtual Fab’ is an online platform customers can use to ensure “instant communication and information update, and thorough protection of customer’s confidential information” (TSMC, 2018, 66). In 2018, the company also outlined its proprietary information protection strategy, which included almost 50,000 employees certified in the area and 3 million checks (TSMC, 2018, 68-69). Since then, it has authorised its Audit Committee with relevant organisations such as the Corporate Information Security Organisation, which are responsible for risk management policies and implementation of effective security protection measures in different areas such as software and cyber security (TSMC, 2023). The Economist claims that this prioritisation of secretiveness and confidentiality was one of the reasons why Apple chose TSMC to make their chips (The Economist, 2021).
TSMC’s strategy therefore considers the high stakes of the industry and prioritises customer service and protection. This, in conjunction with its strong production capacity and government support explain its status as the world’s leader in semiconductor manufacturing. Yet, one should not overlook the importance of reputation in its success. As the world’s first foundry and its track record of achievements such as securing clients like Apple, TSMC will likely continue to dominate as companies and governments around the will rely on its unique expertise.
Analysis: Geopolitics
My analysis of TSMC’s case study will consider the influence of geopolitics in conducting semiconductor business in China. It is difficult to overlook the strategic significance of semiconductors in terms of commerciality, national security, and militaries. It is therefore not surprising that their production, distribution, and technology pose an issue of incomparable geopolitical interest. This is particularly true for companies operating in the U.S. and China. As the world’s largest semiconductor manufacturer, TSMC operates in both and has managed to become irreplaceable. This has created opportunities and risks for the company, which can be understood through geopolitical tensions. One cannot overstate the importance of TSMC in this “race for semiconductor chips” as 92% of the most advanced chips are made in Taiwan (John Neuffler, 2023). Its business ventures are therefore greatly impacted by geopolitical tensions and government policies arising from them. This part of the essay will consider the opportunities and risks faced by TSMC arising from the geopolitics of semiconductor business in China.
Geopolitical opportunities for the company include production diversification, such as the opening of a fab in Arizona and proof of loyalty to their biggest clients, the Americans (The Economist, 2023). Whilst these are significant opportunities for the company itself, this “de-Taiwansiation” and its siding with “Uncle Sam” only create risks for the company’s business in China (The Economist, 2023). Whilst there was once hope that TSMC was Taiwan’s “silicon shield” (Cronin, 2021), recent heightening of tensions limited geopolitical opportunities to doing business with non-Chinese clients.
The Sino-American geopolitical struggle makes TSMC’s business in China increasingly difficult. The first challenge arises from semiconductor policies and the second is the Chinese efforts for self-reliance that follow from them.
The most glaring example of a government policy that has negatively influenced TSMC’s business in China is the American CHIPS Act. Under this act, companies that receive federal incentives for American semiconductor facilities are prohibited from working significantly with “countries of concern” (Shivakumar et al, 2023). TSMC used these incentives to build their Arizona fab (The Economist, 2022). The U.S. Department of Commerce granted TSMC a one-year waiver to continue their business with China (The Economist, 2023), and this was recently extended indefinitely (Lee, 2023). This will allow TSMC to continue its plans to expand its Nanjing fab to produce 28nm chips, but this commitment to the Americans still limits Chinese business in terms of producing “advanced graphics and AI processors” (Cheng, 2022). This is not the only way in which U.S. policies have caused issues for TSMC’s relations with their Chinese clients, as the company had to halt business with Huawei, a major Chinese client, when it was blacklisted by the U.S. (Li et al., 2023). This ban was a result of geopolitical tensions which caused Western countries to criticise or ban Huawei, due to its connection to the Chinese military (Miller, 2022, 314). This highlights the geopolitical limitations imposed on TSMC’s business in China by foreign government policies. The impossible-to-overstate strategic significance of semiconductors means that the industry and its leaders like TSMC are caught in the middle of a Cold-War style trade war (Eurasia Group, 2020), in which they are asked to “choose sides” (The Economist, 2023). Many are predicting that “TSMC will slow down its investment in” China, highlighting the geopolitical difficulties of the semiconductor sector (Shivakumar et al, 2023).
The above sheds light on China’s reliance on its “geopolitical rivals” for its semiconductors, with Chinese companies lacking the technology to produce “commercially competitive” chips such as the GPU and x86 chips (Miller, 2022, 249-250). This causes another problem for TSMC, namely the heightened pressure on China to become self-reliant in light of international export controls. With Taiwanese loyalty to the U.S., China is investing heavily in their own chipmakers, demonstrated in their $1.9 billion investment in Yangtze Memory Technologies Co (YMTC) (Bloomberg News, 2023). In fact, YMTC says it is “focused on “building the country’s own chips and realising the Chinese dream,” and not commercial goals (Miller, 2022, 325). Whilst “an all-domestic supply chain” is “simply impossible” (Miller, 2022, 323), China’s position in the global market is greatly improving. A recent report from the International Data Corporation (IDC) revealed that “geopolitical shifts reshape [the] semiconductor landscape” (IDC, 2023), with China’s market share being predicted to grow by 2% in 2027, and Taiwan’s to decrease by 3% (Kaur, 2023). This rapid advancement is a result of the self-reliance efforts as a response to international export controls (Kaur, 2023) The focus on its national industry is not surprising, as it is becoming increasingly difficult for China to not see TSMC’s promises to expand in both the U.S. and China as “diplomatic theatre” (The Economist, 2023). China does dominate part of the industry, namely legacy chips, so companies do depend on it for part of the supply chain, making it a significant competitor (Gupta et al., 2023). This, in conjunction with China’s retaliation through export bans of rare-earth processing materials used in semiconductor production (Bloomberg, 2023), and their Made in China 2025 policy could hinder TSMC’s focus on their Chinese business.
With the trade war not slowing down, semiconductor companies are choosing sides between global superpowers (Che, et al, 2023). For TSMC, their siding with the U.S. has created obstacles in doing business in China.
Conclusion
This essay has analysed the international semiconductor industry, China’s unique sector, and the role of TSMC in this context. The case study of the company considered its rise and strategy. This was followed by an analysis of the case study through the lens of geopolitics, which revealed that semiconductor companies must operate within the high geopolitical stakes of the U.S.-China trade war. Whilst this situation is still unfolding, tensions are still rising, and TSMC faces risks in doing business in China.
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